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as well as being practically suited to current copyright business
practices. Much of this scholarship has prioritized a right of
attribution over other moral rights, such as the right of integrity.
This Article evaluates some of these recent moral rights models in
light of a sample of comments made by American supernatural
fiction authors about their works. The Author questions whether
the moral rights models advocated in modern discourse effectively
fill the gaps between authors’ stated interests and the protections
currently available under copyright law. The Author also
questions the extent to which authors’ rights should be elevated
above others’ rights to enjoy and adapt their works.
INTRODUCTION
The word create . . . derives from the Latin verb
creo, which means “to give birth to.” . . . The
concept that an author “gives birth” to her artistic
creations provides the foundation for the
insurmountable connection between an author and
her work.1
The United States has had a checkered history with moral
rights legislation. As a signatory to the Berne Convention,2 the
United States is obliged to protect certain moral rights of authors
of copyrighted works.3 However, since signing the Convention, it
is unclear whether the United States has complied with those
obligations.4 The government has maintained that existing

1

ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS
LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 13–14 (2010).
2
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, revised at Paris
July 24, 1971, 331 U.N.T.S. 217 [hereinafter Berne Convention], available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs_wo001.html.
3
Id. art. 6bis; MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 389 (5th ed.,
2010) (describing the moral rights set out in the Berne Convention as the right of
integrity—the right not to have a work mutilated or distorted—and the right of
paternity—the right of the author to be acknowledged as the author of the work).
4
Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 6bis(1) (“Independently of the author’s
economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the
right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other
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copyright, trademark, contract, defamation, privacy, and unfair
competition laws,5 supplemented by provisions of the Visual
Artists’ Rights Act (“VARA”),6 sufficiently comply with Article
6bis—the moral rights provision.7 However, a number of
commentators maintain that the United States is not in compliance
with the Article.8 In recent years, copyright scholars have renewed
the debate about the need for moral rights protections in the United

modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be
prejudicial to his honor or reputation.”).
5
LEAFFER, supra note 3, at 390 (“Although American copyright law has never
adopted an integrated version of the moral right, some case law has come very close to
achieving the same result in protecting certain aspects of the author’s integrity and
paternity rights. The leading case is Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., where
plaintiff’s right to prevent distortion of his work was protected under both the copyright
and unfair competition laws . . . . In addition to copyright and unfair competition laws,
American authors have turned to contract, defamation, and privacy laws to protect other
aspects of their artistic personality and reputation.” Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 538
F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976)).
6
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128.
7
LEAFFER, supra note 3, at 380 (“Congress justified its decision not to adopt specific
moral rights legislation, claiming that the United States already gives de facto recognition
to moral rights when the entirety of American law is considered. But serious doubts
lingered about whether U.S. obligations under Berne had really been met, without
specific recognition of moral rights. The proponents of specific legislation quickly
prevailed. Congress responded by passing the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
(‘VARA’).”).
8
KWALL, supra note 1, at 37 (“[T]here is the stark reality that [the United States] may
not be in compliance with our [moral rights] obligations under the Berne Convention.”);
LEAFFER, supra note 3, at 387 (noting that the United States has arguably not yet fulfilled
its obligations under Article 6bis of the Berne Convention); see also id. at 393
(“Ironically, VARA falls short of conforming to the requirements of the Berne
Convention. Most significantly, VARA specifies that protection lasts no longer than the
life of [the] author whereas Berne requires that moral rights should be protected at least
for the term of the related economic rights—which in the United States is the life of the
author plus 70 years.”); Margaret Ann Wilkinson & Natasha Gerolami, The Author as
Agent of Information Policy: The Relationship Between Economic and Moral Rights in
Copyright, 26 GOV’T INFO. Q. 321, 327–30 (2009) (“The United States, which is now a
signatory to the Berne Convention and leading proponent of strong foreign and
international intellectual property protection, still does not have significant moral rights
provisions in its copyright legislation. . . . [M]any believe that American law does not
provide moral rights protection sufficient to satisfy the Berne Convention . . . despite the .
. . passage of the limited Visual Artists’ Rights Act (1990).”) .
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States, and have considered what such protections might look like
in practice.9
There are a number of reasons for the renewed interest in moral
rights in recent years. In particular, as noted by Professor Neil
Netanel, digital technologies allow authors to relatively easily
express their preferences for uses of their works online.10 This has
already occurred in the copyright context, particularly under the
Creative Commons License scheme.11 Creative Commons licenses
enable authors to market their work with the freedoms they intend
to bestow on subsequent users.12 Thus, a workable model already
exists for authors to express their preferences about moral rights, if
a broader moral rights agenda were to be adopted in the United
States. Another reason to revisit moral rights, also related to
digital technology, is that Internet technologies have rapidly made
the world a much smaller place. Perceived disharmonizations in
the law can be problematic when creators are now sharing their
works online on a global scale.13
This Article aims to synthesize some of the more recent digital
developments involving copyright works with some of the relevant
scholarship on moral rights in the United States. The idea is to
evaluate the extent to which some of the newly proposed moral
rights models for the United States would address stated concerns
of authors particularly with respect to downstream online uses of

9

See KWALL, supra note 1, at 147–65; NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S
PARADOX 215–17 (2008).
10
NETANEL, supra note 9, at 216 (“Digital technology may well ease the burden of
compliance [with copyright and moral rights law].”).
11
Id. at 216–17 (noting use of Creative Commons licensing scheme for authors to
express preferences in relation to online uses of their works).
12
LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID
ECONOMY, 277 (2008) (“Creative Commons [(“CC”)] gives authors free tools—legal
tools (copyright licenses) and technical tools (metadata and simple marking
technology)—to mark their creativity with the freedoms they intend it to carry. So if
you’re a teacher, and you want people to share your work, CC gives you a tool to signal
this to others. Or if you’re a photographer and don’t mind if others collect your work, but
don’t want Time magazine to take your work without your permission, then CC would
give you a license to signal this.”).
13
KWALL, supra note 1, at 37 (“As of the close of the first decade of the twenty-first
century, the United States appears to be rather isolated in its failure to recognize
explicitly adequate moral rights.”).
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their copyrighted works. Part I examines the nature of moral rights
and the checkered history of moral rights protections in the United
States. Part II addresses a small sample of comments made by
authors of supernatural fiction about downstream uses of their
works online. These authorial concerns are not particularly well
protected by current copyright laws, and the question arises
whether moral rights would provide more appropriate protections.
Supernatural fiction authors are chosen for examination because
they tend to be very articulate in the blogosphere and often
maintain active dialogue with their fans about preferred
downstream uses of their works.
Part III introduces some of the newer models for moral rights
protections advocated in recent years by American copyright
scholars Professors Neil Netanel and Roberta Rosenthal Kwall. It
examines the extent to which these models might effectively
address some of the authorial concerns identified in Part II. Part
IV concludes with some comments about ways in which moral
rights and copyright law could be developed in the future to better
address some of these authorial concerns. It further questions the
extent to which authorial concerns should be allowed to dictate
downstream uses of copyright works.
I. MORAL RIGHTS: NATURE AND SCOPE
A. Moral Rights versus Copyrights
When an artist creates, be he an author, a painter, a
sculptor, an architect or a musician, he does more
than bring into the world a unique object having
only exploitive possibilities; he projects into the
world part of his personality and subjects it to the
ravages of public use. There are possibilities of
injury to the creator other than merely economic
ones; these the copyright statute does not protect.14

14
Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists,
Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 557 (1940).
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Many commentators have noted that the economic rights
protected by copyright law do not grant full protection for the
kinds of interests a creator may want to assert in her work.15
Copyright law is aimed at encouraging the production and
dissemination of literary and artistic works by providing sufficient
economic incentives to creators of those works.16 Copyright law
prevents the unauthorized copying or dissemination of a protected
work, thus preserving the incentives to create.17 If an author can
secure control of the work in the marketplace, she may feel more
confident creating and disseminating the work.
However, copyrights do not fully capture the nature of the
relationship between an author and her work.18 For one thing,
copyrights are assignable,19 meaning that an author may not be in a
position to control downstream uses of a work post-assignment. In
fact, in jurisdictions where moral rights are available, authors will
often invoke those rights against a copyright owner: that is, a
person to whom the copyright has been assigned.20
Further, creators of copyright works engage in their artistic
endeavors for reasons other than pecuniary reward. Some authors

15

See, e.g., id. (“The copyright law, of course, protects the economic exploitation of
the fruits of artistic creation; but the economic, exploitive aspect of the problem is only
one of its many facets . . . .”); Wilkinson & Gerolami, supra note 8, at 321 (“[T]he
economic rights of copyright, though identified with an author, do not, in and of
themselves, protect the relationship between the author and the text.”).
16
Wilkinson & Gerolami, supra note 8, at 322 (“The stated purpose of copyright has
long been taken to be to encourage the production and dissemination of works thereby
increasing access to information.”).
17
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (setting out the exclusive rights of copyright holders);
Wilkinson & Gerolami, supra note 8, at 321 (“The economic rights grant the copyright
holders exclusive privilege to make various uses of a work including copying, publishing,
performing, translating, and adapting the work.”).
18
Wilkinson & Gerolami, supra note 8, at 321 (“[T]he economic rights of copyright,
though identified with an author, do not, in and of themselves, protect the relationship
between the author and the text.”).
19
17 U.S.C. §§ 201(d), 204; Wilkinson & Gerolami, supra note 8, at 322
(“[Copyrights] are transferable and, therefore, the author, at any given time, is not
necessarily the rights holder.”).
20
Wilkinson & Gerolami, supra note 8, at 328 (“Moral rights can be invoked by an
author to oppose an economic rights holder’s exploitation of the work in a way deemed to
harm the reputation of the author.”).
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“write for glory and fame,”21 others for the sake of the purely
creative process in and of itself.22 In the software industry, for
example, it has been recognized that motivations such as
“intellectual stimulation and enjoyment of the creative process” are
drivers of innovation in software coding, often more so than
financial rewards or career advancement.23 Professor Kwall has
identified a number of situations where creators are spurred by an
intrinsic urge to create rather than by any expectation of financial
reward.24 She cites as examples of this phenomenon: “the cave
drawings of prehistoric man, the artistic creations of inmates on
death row, and the works of authorship produced by the inhabitants
of the Nazi death camps during World War II.”25
Given the diverse motivations for creation and the variety of
relationships authors have with their creations, a law that focuses
purely on the protection of economic rights will miss important
elements of the creative process. This was realized towards the
beginning of the nineteenth century in Europe.26 Since that time,
moral rights have developed throughout both civil and common
law jurisdictions.27 Moral rights are further reflected in several
international treaties.28 The one notable exception is that moral
21
Roeder, supra note 14, at 566 (“[A]uthors write for glory and fame as well as for
pecuniary advantage . . . .”).
22
KWALL, supra note 1, at 11 (“[M]any artists create for the sake of the creative
process rather than to generate profits.”).
23
Id. at 11–12 (quoting SUSAN SCAFIDI, WHO OWNS CULTURE? APPROPRIATION AND
AUTHENTICITY IN AMERICAN LAW 117 (2005)).
24
Id. at 20.
25
Id.
26
Roeder, supra note 14, at 555 (“The [moral rights] doctrine has been best expressed
and studied in France. As early as the beginning of the nineteenth century cases are
found which, emphasizing the criminal statutes against plagiarism, protected the right of
the creator to have the form of his work preserved from deformation by subsequent
transferees.”); see also KWALL, supra note 1, at 39 (noting the early development of
moral rights in France in the nineteenth century).
27
KWALL, supra note 1, at 37 (noting the existence of substantive moral rights laws in
both civil and common law jurisdictions outside the United States).
28
See Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 6bis; WIPO Performances and Phonograms
Treaty of 1996 art. 5(1), Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17 (1997), 36 I.L.M. 76
[hereinafter WIPO Treaty] (“Independently of a performer’s economic rights, and even
after the transfer of those rights, the performer shall, as regards his live aural
performances or performances fixed in phonograms, have the right to claim to be
identified as the performer of his performances, except where omission is dictated by the
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rights are not included in the 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPs”).29
Moral rights can encompass a variety of different elements of
the author’s relationship with her work, and the exact scope of the
rights differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.30 The relevant
international treaties—the Berne Convention, and the World
Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) Performances and
Phonograms Treaty31—focus on two distinct rights: the right of
attribution or paternity,32 and the right of integrity.33 These rights
are the focus of the remainder of this discussion.
However, it is worth noting that some civil jurisdictions
maintain a broader array of moral rights. Courts in a number of
civil law jurisdictions have recognized additional rights such as the
right to refuse to create, the right to create and publish in any form
desired, the right to withdraw or destroy the work, the prohibition
against excessive criticism, and the prohibition against other
injuries to the creator’s personality.34 Even the more well accepted
rights of integrity and attribution vary in nature and scope from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.35

manner of the use of the performance, and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other
modification of his performances that would be prejudicial to his reputation.”) .
29
KWALL, supra note 1, at 37 (“Although the 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) incorporates the Berne Convention and
provides for sanctions for noncompliance, the United States insured that Article 6bis was
excluded from the ‘rights and obligations’ TRIPs delineates.”).
30
Id. at 38 (“Moral rights . . . remain ‘chiefly a matter of national law.’ Historically,
there has been a divergence in moral rights protection between civil and common law
traditions, although recently the majority of common law jurisdictions have enacted
moral rights protections to some degree.”).
31
See WIPO Treaty, supra note 28.
32
LEAFFER, supra note 3, at 389 (describing the right of paternity as “the right to be
acknowledged as an author of the work”).
33
Id. (describing the right of integrity as “the right that the work not be mutilated or
distorted”).
34
Roeder, supra note 14, at 556 (summarizing these rights); see also KWALL, supra
note 1, at 44 (describing the right of disclosure and the right of withdrawal available in
some civil law jurisdictions).
35
KWALL, supra note 1, at 42–45 (noting differences of application in the law relating
to attribution and integrity in specific cases in France and Germany).
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B. The Rights of Attribution and Integrity
Article 6bis(1) of the Berne Convention obligates signatory
countries to protect an author’s rights of attribution or paternity,
and of integrity:
Independently of the author’s economic rights, and
even after the transfer of the said rights, the author
shall have the right to claim authorship of the work
and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other
modification of, or other derogatory action in
relation to, the said work, which would be
prejudicial to his honor or reputation.36
The language protecting the “right to claim authorship of the
work” is generally referred to as an attribution or paternity right.37
The language pertaining to an author’s right to object to
distortions, mutilations, modifications and other derogatory actions
in relation to a work is generally referred to as the right of
integrity.38 All Berne signatories must, at a minimum, protect
these rights, although nothing precludes a signatory country from
adopting a broader moral rights agenda.39

36

Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 6bis.
LEAFFER, supra note 3, at 389.
38
Id.
39
KWALL, supra note 1, at 44 (describing moral rights recognized in European
jurisdictions outside of the Berne Convention requirements); LEAFFER, supra note 3, at
389 (noting that traditional European formulations of moral rights would generally
include the right of disclosure as well as potentially the right of withdrawal, the right of
modification and the right to prevent excessive criticism); Roeder, supra note 14, at 556
(“The second half of the nineteenth century witnessed a rapid development of the [moral
rights] concept. The right to refuse to create, the right of paternity, the right to prevent
deformation of the work, all received recognition in civil courts . . . . The various
ramifications of the doctrine have been constantly developed in Europe and, in addition
to the rights already mentioned, the moral right may now be said to consist of the right to
create and publish in any form desired, the creator’s right to claim the paternity of his
work, the right to prevent every deformation, mutilation or other modification thereof, the
right to withdraw and destroy the work, the prohibition against excessive criticism, and
the prohibition against all other injuries to the creator’s personality.”).
37
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The language of Article 6bis(1) leaves some questions open
even with respect to the rights of attribution and integrity.40 For
example, it is unclear whether the right to “claim authorship” of
the work includes the right not to be identified as the author of a
work. In a discussion of anonymous authors, pseudonymous
authors, ghost writers, and collective works, Professor Kwall notes
that: “an author’s decision to write anonymously or under a
pseudonym can be viewed as a branding choice that is a
fundamental part of the author’s meaning and message.”41 If the
aim of the attribution right is to protect the author’s meaning and
message,42 then one might argue that the author has a right not to
be identified as the author of the work—at least in cases where
anonymity or pseudonymity is essential to the author’s meaning
and message.
It is also unclear from the wording of Article 6bis(1) whether
destruction of a work by a copyright holder falls within the scope
of the right of integrity. The Convention requires that an author
should have the right to object to “distortion, mutilation or other
modification of, or other derogatory action” in relation to the
work.43 It is unclear whether or not this encompasses destruction
of the work, particularly in cases where the destruction does not
affect the “honor or reputation” of the author.44 In fact, many
countries with well developed moral rights laws do not protect
authors against destruction of a work,45 although the Swiss law

40

KWALL, supra note 1, at 89 (noting unclear history of interpretation of the Visual
Artists’ Rights Act and the Berne Convention as to whether a right of anonymity or
pseudonymity should be protected as part of the right of attribution).
41
Id.
42
Id. at 87 (noting that the primary objective of moral rights might be to safeguard the
meaning and message of the author’s work).
43
Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 6bis(1).
44
KWALL, supra note 1, at 44–45 (“Perhaps the underlying rationale for the failure of
most countries to prevent destructions of works of art is that a work that has been
destroyed completely cannot reflect adversely upon the creator’s honor or reputation. Of
course, this explanation is not relevant to those instances where a work is destroyed in a
manner that subjects the creator to shame or embarrassment.” (citations omitted)).
45
Id.; Roeder, supra note 14, at 569 (“The right to prevent deformation does not
include the right to prevent destruction of a created work. The doctrine of moral right
finds one social basis in the need of a creator for protection of his honor and reputation.
To deform his work is to present him to the public as the creator of a work that is not his
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requires an owner of an artwork to offer to sell it back to its creator
prior to destroying it.46
Other issues left open by Article 6bis include the duration of
moral rights. Article 6bis(2) provides that the rights of attribution
and integrity generally must be maintained after the death of the
author at least until the expiry of the economic rights in a work.47
However, there is no further guidance on the appropriate duration
of moral rights. It is unclear whether, or to what extent, moral
rights should endure after the expiration of copyright in a given
work. Professor Kwall has suggested that moral rights protections
should not, in fact, endure beyond the original creator’s death.48
This is because of her view that moral rights protect the author’s
intended “meaning and message” of her work and that no one’s
judgment about the meaning and message—not even that of the
author’s descendants—can be substituted for the author’s own
judgment.49 She also believes that limiting the duration of moral
rights to the term of the original author’s life will mitigate free
speech concerns, including concerns about maintaining a vibrant
public domain of information and ideas.50 Of course, this approach
own, and thus make him subject to criticism for work he has not done; the destruction of
his work does not have this result.”).
46
KWALL, supra note 1, at 44.
47
Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 6bis(2) (“The rights granted to the author in
accordance with the preceding paragraph shall, after his death, be maintained, at least
until the expiry of the economic rights, and shall be exercisable by the persons or
institutions authorized by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed.
However, those countries whose legislation, at the moment of their ratification of or
accession to this Act, does not provide for the protection after the death of the author of
all the rights set out in the preceding paragraph may provide that some of these rights
may, after his death, cease to be maintained.”).
48
KWALL, supra note 1, at 159 (“[F]rom a theoretical standpoint, moral rights
protection should exist for the author’s lifetime, but not beyond.”).
49
Id. at 160 (“No one, not even the author’s spouse and children, can substitute a
personal judgment regarding the substance of the author’s meaning and message of her
work. Therefore, the author functions as the guardian of the work’s original meaning and
message during her lifetime.”).
50
Id. (“Moreover, a duration equivalent to the author’s life reinforces a vibrant public
domain.”); id. at 54 (“At the risk of vast oversimplification, the concept of the public
domain in intellectual property law entails common ownership by the public as a whole
of the property comprising the public domain. This means that each member of the
public has a ‘property interest’ and ‘an equal right to adapt and transform the material in
question.’”); see also JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF

C01_LIPTON_20110425 (DO NOT DELETE)

548

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

4/26/2011 6:40 PM

[Vol. 21:537

is not consistent with the requirements of the Berne Convention, as
Professor Kwall acknowledges.51
It is also unclear from the wording of Article 6bis whether the
rights of attribution and integrity should be transferable or
waivable.
Most theorists agree that moral rights are not
transferable, unlike copyrights.52 This is because copyrights are in
effect a property or quasi-property right53 while moral rights are
personal rights.54 However, in effect, allowing waiver of moral
rights—which many countries do55—is tantamount to allowing a
transfer, in the sense that the author agrees to give up a right she
could otherwise exercise. Like a transfer, the waiver will generally
operate to the benefit of a third party copyright holder who may

MIND 38 (2008) (describing the public domain as “material that is not covered by
intellectual property rights”).
51
See KWALL, supra note 1, at 160 (“One possible difficulty with this position,
however, is that my recommended period of protection is not consistent with the Berne
Convention’s recommendation, the norms in the international community, or with the
entirety of VARA.”).
52
See, e.g., Roeder, supra note 14, at 564 (“Moral rights are personal rights; they are
not based on any theory of property, for whatever ‘property’ the creator may possess
exists in the rights protected by the copyright statute. Moral rights are akin to those
rights in tort which protect the individual against injury. They may not, therefore, be
assigned . . . .”); KWALL, supra note 1, at 50–51 (noting that in Canada moral rights
cannot be assigned but they can be waived). But see KWALL, supra note 1, at 35 (noting
that in some civil law countries, such as France, authors’ moral rights are often treated as
a special category of property that cannot be waived or transferred); NETANEL, supra note
9, at 215 (noting that the continental European model of moral rights accords authors
inalienable rights to control “the timing and manner in which their creative works are
disseminated to the public”).
53
See 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2006) (describing conditions for “ownership” and “transfer” of
copyrights).
54
Roeder, supra note 14, at 564 (“Moral rights are personal rights; they are not based
on any theory of property . . . .”).
55
See KWALL, supra note 1, at 50–51 (describing the waiver systems adopted in
common law jurisdictions such as Australia and Canada); Wilkinson & Gerolami, supra
note 8, at 329 (“[I]nternationally, there has been a trend which may reflect increasing
neglect of moral rights rather than an embracing of these provisions. Even in countries
where moral rights provisions exist, such as Canada, moral rights may have suffered
erosion. Canada, for example, in its 1988 amendments, introduced a waiver clause to its
moral rights legislation. Such a clause may greatly weaken the rights of authors because
they may easily be required to waive their rights as a condition of publication . . . .”
(citations omitted)).
THE
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want to exploit the protected work in a manner inconsistent with
the original author’s preferences.
Professor Kwall has suggested that ideally moral rights should
not be waivable for two reasons. First, because theoretically it
makes no sense to waive a right that is intended to preserve
authorship dignity,56 and, second, because allowing waiver of
moral rights exacerbates disparities of bargaining power between
creators and those with whom they contract.57
One final issue which is left ambiguous by the wording of
Article 6bis is the precise relationship between the two rights
contemplated in the Article. The wording seems to indicate that
the rights of attribution and integrity are two distinct rights and,
indeed, certain elements, like the notion of damage to the author’s
“honor or reputation” are limited to the right of integrity.
However, there is clearly some overlap between the rights. As
some scholars have noted, the notion of attribution clearly impacts
on a work’s meaning and message.58 Thus, the attribution right
often does very similar work to the right of integrity in preserving
the author’s intended meaning and message.
This was recognized as early as 1910 in the case of Clemens v.
Press Publishing Co.59 where Judge Seabury noted the relationship
between the right of attribution and the integrity of the author’s
artistic vision:

56

KWALL, supra note 1, at 156–57 (“[F]ormal waivers should be inoperative as a
general matter. Given that moral rights are designed to recognize inspirational
motivations for creativity, any system sanctioning waiver is inconsistent from a
theoretical standpoint with the justifications for adopting these protections. In other
words, if moral rights protections are intended to redress violations of authorship dignity,
they should not be capable of being waived. An author always should be in a position to
inform the public that a publicly displayed or distributed version of her work does not
comport with her artistic vision . . . .”).
57
Id. at 157 (“[A]llowing waiver exacerbates the disparity of bargaining power
between authors and those with whom they contract.”).
58
Id. at 89 (“There is good reason for [the] view . . . that an author’s decision to write
anonymously or under a pseudonym can be viewed as a branding choice that is a
fundamental part of the author’s meaning and message.”).
59
67 Misc. 183 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1910). For a discussion of this case, see Roeder, supra
note 14, at 562–63.
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If the intent of the parties was that the defendant
should purchase the rights to the literary property
and publish it, the author is entitled not only to be
paid for his work, but to have it published in the
manner in which he wrote it. The purchaser cannot
garble it or put it out under another name than the
author’s; nor can he omit altogether the name of the
author, unless his contract with the latter permits
him to do so.60
Professor Marshall Leaffer similarly recognizes the
relationship between the two rights set out in Article 6bis in noting
that the right of attribution encompasses the right “to prevent the
use of [the artist’s] name as the author of the work in the event of a
distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work that would
be prejudicial to her honor or reputation.”61 By linking the notion
of attribution with that of distortions of the work that are
prejudicial to the author’s honor or reputation, Professor Leaffer
emphasizes the link between the rights of attribution and integrity.
In summary, it is clear that Article 6bis contemplates the
existence of personal rights in the creator of a copyright work that
are separate to copyright and that protect different aspects of the
creator’s relationship with the work than copyright. However, the
precise interpretation of Article 6bis, and the way in which
signatory countries choose to implement its provisions, varies
widely. Resulting divergences in opinion on the nature and scope
of the rights of attribution and integrity are important in
considering whether and how enhanced moral rights protections
might be developed within the United States.
The remainder of this article considers some comments that
modern authors have made about the kinds of rights they would
like to protect in their works, and some recent moral rights models
that have been advocated by scholars in the United States. The
aim is to analyze the extent to which these newly advocated moral
rights models effectively address recently articulated authorial
concerns about protection of aspects of their works. This article
60
61

Clemens, 67 Misc. at 184.
LEAFFER, supra note 3, at 395.
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focuses on authors of popular supernatural fiction as one subset of
authors who have been extremely articulate about downstream uses
of their work.
II. WHAT (SUPERNATURAL FICTION) AUTHORS WANT
I do not allow fan fiction. The characters are
copyrighted. It upsets me terribly to even think
about fan fiction with my characters. I advise my
readers to write your own original stories with your
own characters. It is absolutely essential that you
respect my wishes.62
These words by the reigning queen of vampire fiction, Anne
Rice,63 are an interesting example of an author articulating her
perceived or preferred rights in relation to her popularly released
works. In particular, she voices concerns about fan fiction.64 Fan
fiction involves fans of an original work writing their own
prequels, sequels and re-tellings of the original stories from
different points of view.65 More often than not, fan fiction is not
authorized by the creator of the original work, although some
creators now welcome fan fiction, but may attempt to impose
certain restrictions on its later use and dissemination.66 Despite
Rice’s words, it is unclear in the United States whether or not fan
62
Anne Rice, Anne Rice Readers Interaction, ANNERICE.COM: THE OFFICIAL SITE,
http://www.annerice.com/ReaderInteraction-MessagesToFans.html (last visited Sept. 14,
2009).
63
Author of The Vampire Chronicles: INTERVIEW WITH THE VAMPIRE (1976); THE
VAMPIRE LESTAT (1985); THE QUEEN OF THE DAMNED (1988); THE TALE OF THE BODY
THIEF (1992); MEMNOCH, THE DEVIL (1995); THE VAMPIRE ARMAND (1998); MERRICK
(2000); BLOOD AND GOLD (2001); BLACKWOOD FARM (2002); BLOOD CANTICLE (2003).
See Anne Rice, All Books, In Order, ANNERICE.COM: THE OFFICIAL SITE,
http://www.annerice.com/Bookshelf-AllBooksInOrder.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2011).
64
Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Everyone’s a Superhero: A Cultural Theory
of “Mary Sue” Fan Fiction as Fair Use, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 597, 598 n.6 (2007) (defining
“fan fiction” as “fiction about characters or settings written by fans of the original work,
rather than the original creators”).
65
Id.
66
HENRY JENKINS, CONVERGENCE CULTURE: WHERE OLD AND NEW MEDIA COLLIDE
152 (2006) (“In 2000, Lucasfilm offered Star Wars fans free Web space
(www.starwars.com) and unique content for their sites, but only under the condition that
whatever they created would become the studio’s intellectual property.”).
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fiction infringes an original author’s copyright.67 Most likely, the
answer to this question will depend on the facts of a given case. It
is also unclear under American copyright law whether or not
fictional characters can in fact be copyrighted, as asserted by
Rice.68
Assuming her characters are copyrightable, Rice is probably
correct in her assumption that readers who create fan fiction using
her characters without her authorization will be infringing her
copyright. The question for this discussion is whether copyright
really gets to the heart of the interests that Rice is attempting to
assert. Even though she frames her concerns in terms of the
copyrightability of her characters, copyright is intended to protect
economic rights of the author, rather than her personal rights in her
work.69 From Rice’s comments, it appears that her concerns are
more personal than proprietary. She notes that it “upsets [her]
terribly” to think about others creating fan fiction with her
characters.70 This wording suggests more of a personal injury or
violation than a concern with proprietary benefits. She is not
asserting that her fans are making unjust financial profits by using
her characters.
In fact, fan fiction is generally not sold
commercially in competition with the author of the original work.71
Thus, Rice’s stated concerns do not appear to be commercial or
proprietary in nature. Rather they appear to be personal—the idea

67

Steven Hetcher, Using Social Norms to Regulate Fan Fiction and Remix Culture,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 1869, 1872 (2009) (noting the debate as to whether fan fiction and
online remixing is a copyright infringement or excusable fair use); Dennis Karjala, Harry
Potter, Tanya Grotter, and the Copyright Derivative Work, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 17, 32–34
(2006) (noting conflicting case law in the Harry Potter lexicon about the extent to which
works based on the Harry Potter books are either regarded as copyright infringements or
excusable fair uses).
68
1-2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.12
(Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2010) (noting that there is some uncertainty about whether
fictional characters are copyrightable, although the currently prevailing view is that
sufficiently well defined characters are copyrightable); Karjala, supra note 67, at 24–26
(describing the historical development of American courts’ attitudes towards
copyrighting fictional characters).
69
See LEAFFER, supra note 3, at 2.
70
Rice, Anne Rice Readers Interaction, supra note 62.
71
Hetcher, supra note 67, at 1885 (“Within the fan-fiction community, there is a norm
against seeking commercial gain.”).
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that the fans have violated her personal dignity in some way. Even
the way Rice says that it is “absolutely essential that you respect
my wishes” suggests an emotive attachment to her work, rather
than a pecuniary motivation behind her concerns.72 The language
is that of a creator seeking to protect the artistic integrity of her
creation, rather than of a commercial actor seeking to protect her
bottom line. Thus, even though her concerns are expressed in
copyright language, they contain significant moral rights
undertones. It may be that Rice uses copyright language precisely
because there is no moral rights protection for fictional works in
the United States.73 Copyright is thus the closest legal right she
can assert, short of simply appealing to her fans’ good faith in
respecting her wishes.
Rice is not alone in articulating her strong views about fan
fiction. Another vampire novelist, Charlaine Harris, creator of the
popular Sookie Stackhouse novels,74 has this to say on her website
in response to an author query about fan fiction:
Q. Can I post my cool story about Sookie on this
site?
A. No, and I’ll tell you why. No fanfic can appear
on this website. Not only does it make me feel
strange to have other people use my characters, but
there are legal issues to consider.75
Harris’s comments differ from Rice’s in several ways, although
her concerns about fan fiction seem very similar. Like Rice, Harris

72

Rice, Anne Rice Readers Interaction, supra note 62.
LEAFFER, supra note 3, at 393 (“The Visual Artists Rights Act is limited in its
subject matter and scope and is essentially confined to the protection of works of fine art.
Qualifying works include those that exist in a single copy, such as original paintings,
drawings, prints, sculptures, or works existing in signed and consecutively numbered
editions of no more than 200 copies.”).
74
DEAD UNTIL DARK (2001); LIVING DEAD IN DALLAS (2002); CLUB DEAD (2003);
DEAD TO THE WORLD (2004); DEAD AS A DOORNAIL (2005); DEFINITELY DEAD (2006);
ALL TOGETHER DEAD (2007); FROM DEAD TO WORSE (2008); DEAD AND GONE (2009);
DEAD IN THE FAMILY (2010); see also Charlaine Harris, Bibliography: The Sookie
Stackhouse aka Southern Vampire Series, CHARLAINEHARRIS.COM, http://www.
charlaineharris.com/bibliography/bibliog-sookie.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2011).
75
Charlaine Harris, Frequently Asked Questions, CHARLAINEHARRIS.COM,
http://www.charlaineharris.com/faqs.html (last visited July 14, 2010).
73

C01_LIPTON_20110425 (DO NOT DELETE)

554

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

4/26/2011 6:40 PM

[Vol. 21:537

utilizes emotive language in saying that it makes her “feel strange”
to have others use her characters. Unlike Rice, she refers obliquely
to “legal issues” without specifying copyright law in particular.
Harris also limits her comments to the question whether she herself
is prepared to host fan fiction on her own website. Unlike Rice,
Harris does not purport to ban fans from writing their own stories,
but simply says she would feel strange hosting those stories on her
website. It is possible that the legal issues she is referring to relate
to contractual agreements with her publishers not to endorse any
competing works. Hosting such works on her website may
potentially contravene contracts with her publishers, although this
is not immediately obvious from her online comments.
Whether or not Harris’s reference to legal issues is intended to
imply copyright, trademark or contract law, she is clearly not
referring to moral rights as American moral rights law does not
cover fictional writings.76 However, as with Rice’s comments,
Harris’s comments do connote concerns generally associated with
moral rights. She seeks to protect her own authorial dignity and
her emotional investment in characters she has created. Of course
Harris, like Rice, has licensed others to use her characters in
various media. Harris’s characters and plotlines form the basis of
the popular HBO Television Series, True Blood.77 Rice authorized
the use of her characters and storylines in a Broadway musical:
LESTAT.78 Thus, both authors are sufficiently savvy to utilize
copyright law to protect their work in the commercial context even
outside the traditional book-publishing arena. Their concern is not
with lack of economic control over their works. Their stated
concerns to fans have to do with something much more personal
than money.
We see the same pattern again and again on creators’ blogs.
Another extremely popular vampire author, Stephenie Meyer,

76
See LEAFFER, supra note 3, at 393 (noting limited cover of VARA to particular subcategories of the fine arts).
77
See Trueblood: About, HBO, http://www.hbo.com/true-blood/index.html#/trueblood/about/index.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2011).
78
Anne Rice, LESTAT on Broadway, ANNERICE.COM: THE OFFICIAL SITE,
http://www.annerice.com/Lestat-TheMusical.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2011).
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creator of the Twilight books,79 has voiced similar concerns, albeit
in a somewhat different context. As with Rice and Harris, Meyer
has been extremely successful at commercializing her work both
through publication of her books and through licensing
reproductions in different media—notably movies80 and graphic
novels.81 However, she, too has had issues with fans making
unauthorized use of her work. In Meyer’s case, the concern has
not been so much with fan fiction as she does not specifically
mention fan fiction on her website, although she has made some
comments about fan fiction in interviews.82 In the interview
context, she has described being of two minds about fan fiction.
On the one hand she is interested in seeing what people come up
with,83 and she confesses to writing her own brand of
parody/fiction based on her own published novels.84 On the other
hand, she suggests that fans who are good creative writers should

79
TWILIGHT (2005); NEW MOON (2006); ECLIPSE (2007); BREAKING DAWN (2008); see
also Stephenie Meyer, Twilight Series, THE OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF STEPHENIE MEYER,
http://www.stepheniemeyer.com/twilightseries.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2011).
80
TWILIGHT (Summit Entertainment 2008); NEW MOON (Summit Entertainment 2009);
ECLIPSE (Summit Entertainment 2010); see also Box Office/Business for Twilight,
INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1099212/business (last visited
Jan. 18, 2010); Box Office/Business for New Moon, INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE,
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1259571/business (last visited Jan. 18, 2010); Box
Office/Business for Eclipse, INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/title/
tt1099212/business (last visted Jan. 18, 2010).
81
1 STEPHENIE MEYER & YOUNG KIM, TWILIGHT: THE GRAPHIC NOVEL (2010); see
also George Gene Gustines, A World of Words Reinvented in Pictures, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
9, 2010, at C1.
82
Alison Genet, Stephenie Meyer Talks “Twilight” Fan Fiction & “Breaking Down”
(Her Own Private FF), TWIFANS (July 7, 2010, 2:30 PM), http://www.twifans
.com/profiles/blogs/stephenie-meyer-talks-twilight.
83
Id. (“Fan-fiction has become kind of a mixed thing for me. Like in the beginning I
hadn’t heard of it and there were some that were . . . I couldn’t read the ones that had the
characters IN character. It freaked me out. [U]m, but I liked. . . . [T]here was one about
Harry Potter and Twilight that was hilarious. And then there was one that was about a
girl who was starring as Bella in the movie and that was funny. And uh, I hear so many
people arguing about fan-fiction.”).
84
Id. (“Breaking Down was actually a project for a while. There was a while where
you get burned out, we came up with an alternate Breaking Dawn called Breaking Down
(laughs). It was awesome! Complete spiraling downward & destruction in Bella
Swan[’]s life & everyone around her. Charlie became a meth addict.”).
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develop their own plots and characters that they can own and sell
without worrying about infringing other people’s copyrights.85
However, the one concern she raises on her own website—as
well as discussing in interviews86—is a situation involving an
unpublished and incomplete manuscript that was distributed over
the Internet without her authorization. The manuscript was entitled
Midnight Sun and was a retelling of the original first book—
Twilight—from another character’s perspective.87 Twilight is
narrated from the perspective of the series heroine, Bella Swan,88
while Midnight Sun retells the Twilight story from the point of
view of her love interest, the vampire Edward Cullen.89
When she was about half way through the manuscript, she
released the draft to certain people involved in the film adaptation
of the first book so they could get a better idea of the backstory
behind the character of Edward. Subsequently, the manuscript was
leaked on the Internet without Meyer’s authorization. Meyer was
so upset by this unauthorized leak that she gave up work on the
book and never completed it,90 although she did post an “official”

85

Id. (“As long as the writers of it, move on from it. I think it’s sad to spend so much
energy on something you can’t own. And that makes me a little bit sad because all these
talented kids should be, ya know, get your story out from under the bed and get it out
there.”).
86
Id. (“The whole Midnight Sun . . . mess, came about because, when you first get
started, you really want people to read your book & give you feedback and no one’s ever
gonna care, like you don’t have to worry about leaks. That’s such a crazy idea. With MS
you know, I had a readers group and we all read each other’s stuff and that’s very normal.
I saw a lot of feedback, like ‘she shouldn’t be giving her stuff out,’ but 10 years ago
before anybody knew that had ever read Twilight, did you ever think anyone was gonna
care or look for this crap? Absolutely not.”).
87
See Midnight Sun: Twilight with Edward as the Narrator, TWILIGHT NEWS SITE
(Feb. 21, 2010), http://twilightnewssite.com/news-twilight-new-moon-eclipse-breakingdawn/midnight-sun-twilight-with-edward-as-narrator.
88
See id.
89
Id.
90
Stephenie Meyer, Midnight Sun: Edward’s Version of Twilight,
STEPHENIEMEYER.COM (Aug. 28, 2008), http://www.stepheniemeyer.com/midnightsun.
html (“So where does this leave Midnight Sun? My first feeling was that there was no
way to continue. Writing isn’t like math; in math, two plus two always equals four no
matter what your mood is like. With writing, the way you feel changes everything. If I
tried to write Midnight Sun now, in my current frame of mind, James would probably win
and all the Cullens would die, which wouldn’t dovetail too well with the original story.
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version of the incomplete manuscript on her website.91
Accompanying that post, she had this to say:
I did not want my readers to experience Midnight
Sun before it was completed, edited and published.
I think it is important for everybody to understand
that what happened was a huge violation of my
rights as an author, not to mention me as a human
being. As the author of the Twilight Saga, I control
the copyright and it is up to the owner of the
copyright to decide when the books should be made
public; this is the same for musicians and
filmmakers. Just because someone buys a book or
movie or song, or gets a download off the Internet,
doesn’t mean that they own the right to reproduce
and distribute it. Unfortunately, with the Internet, it
is easy for people to obtain and share items that do
not legally belong to them. No matter how this is
done, it is still dishonest. This has been a very
upsetting experience for me, but I hope it will at
least leave my fans with a better understanding of
copyright and the importance of artistic control.92
As with Anne Rice’s post about fan fiction, Meyer here
expresses her concerns in the language of copyright, even though
she characterizes the harm she has suffered as much more personal
than economic in nature. She talks about her rights being violated
both as an author and a human being. This connotes concern with
a dignitary harm rather than a pecuniary harm. She also talks
about the “dishonesty” of the people who posted her manuscript

In any case, I feel too sad about what has happened to continue working on Midnight Sun,
and so it is on hold indefinitely.”).
91
Id. (“I’d rather my fans not read this version of Midnight Sun. It was only an
incomplete draft; the writing is messy and flawed and full of mistakes. But how do I
comment on this violation without driving more people to look for the illegal posting? It
has taken me a while to decide how and if I could respond. But to end the confusion, I’ve
decided to make the draft available here (at the end of this post). This way, my readers
don’t have to feel they have to make a sacrifice to stay honest. I hope this fragment gives
you further insight into Edward’s head and adds a new dimension to the Twilight story.
That’s what inspired me to write it in the first place.”).
92
Id.
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without her authorization. Dishonesty is not an element of a
copyright claim at all. Direct copyright infringement is a strict
liability wrong,93 and the defendant’s state of mind—honest or
dishonest—is irrelevant. Again, this seems to be more of a
personal than an economic issue for Meyer. As with Rice and
Harris, Meyer also talks about how “upsetting” the experience has
been for her when someone has made an unauthorized noncommercial use of her work.
Unlike the fan fiction situations troubling Rice and Harris,
however, Meyer could potentially also suffer economic harm if an
early draft of her manuscript is available online and she later
commercially publishes an official version. It is conceivable that
someone might read the version available online, decide they do
not like it, and not bother to buy the final version, when otherwise
they may have bought it. Of course, it is equally possible—and
probably more likely—that her fans would have been titillated by
the online draft into buying the final published version to see what
happens next and perhaps to compare the early draft with the final
product.
Towards the end of the above quote, Meyer links the idea of
fans “understanding copyright law” with the notion of fans
understanding “the importance of artistic control.” In actual fact,
copyright law tends to have very little to do with artistic control,
particularly in circumstances where the original creator has
assigned the copyright to a publisher or other distributor. While an
author who retains copyright in her work may use it as a tool to
protect her artistic integrity, in the absence of moral rights
protections, an author who assigns her copyright will be out of luck
unless she can convince the assignee to threaten or sue an alleged
infringer. This again indicates the mismatch between the aims of
copyright law and the kinds of interests authors may seek to
protect in relation to their works.

93
17 U.S.C. § 501(a); see also Dane S. Ciolino & Erin A. Donelon, Questioning Strict
Liability in Copyright, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 351 (2002).
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III. EVALUATING NEW MORAL RIGHTS MODELS
A. American Resistance to Moral Rights
[C]omprehensive [moral rights] legislation is likely
to be ill-advised. It is likely to be impracticable in
its application, to be unsettling in its impact upon
longstanding
contractual
and
business
arrangements, to threaten investment in and public
dissemination of the arts, to sharply conflict with
fundamental United States legal principles of
copyright, contract, property and even constitutional
law, and ultimately to stifle much artistic creativity
while resulting in only the most speculative
incentives to such creativity.94
The question for the remainder of this Article is whether a
moral rights agenda might help authors protect some of the aspects
of their works that are currently not very well protected by
copyright law. Several scholars have recently advocated new
moral rights models for the United States that would accommodate
First Amendment concerns as well as associated concerns about
protecting the public domain of information and ideas from overpropertization.95 Before examining these recent moral rights
models, it is worth briefly addressing the historical concerns within
the United States about moral rights, and the explanations for why
the United States has not been more pro-active in developing a
moral rights agenda, despite signing the Berne Convention.
The United States has a strong First Amendment tradition
which includes preserving works within the public domain for
general use. Those opposed to moral rights are concerned about a
personal right that might severely limit uses others may make of

94

Robert A. Gorman, Federal Moral Rights Legislation: The Need for Caution, 14
NOVA L. REV. 421, 422 (1990).
95
NETANEL, supra note 9, at 216 (“[L]imited moral rights protection would do more
than merely assuage authors’ feelings. It would also promote First Amendment values.”);
KWALL, supra note 1, at 54 (“[I]n developing appropriate moral rights protection for the
United States, it is critical to consider how these protections will impact the public
domain.”).
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existing works, particularly those works in the public domain.96
There are associated concerns that moral rights could impinge on
downstream fair uses of protected works. Fair use is generally
regarded in American copyright law as an important protection for
free speech.97 However, if an author asserting a moral right could
prevent an otherwise protected fair use—for example, a parody of
a work—this would be problematic for the First Amendment
balance in copyright law.98 Professor Ilhyung Lee has noted that
VARA—the only specific American moral rights legislation—
expressly makes moral rights subject to fair use in order to
accommodate these concerns.99
Another related concern about moral rights has been raised
with respect to the position of the copyright holder where that
person is a different person than the original creator. The concern
is that it is uncomfortable under American notions of property law
for a personal right, such as a moral right, potentially to trump a
property or quasi-property right. Professor Lee has evocatively
described this concern:
Perhaps most jarring to the American psyche is the
idea of an author’s moral right taking precedence
over another’s property right. The notion that an
artist may, in the name of the personal interests in
the work, prevent the purchaser and holder of title
in the work from doing with it what she wishes may

96

NETANEL, supra note 9, at 215 (“To the extent the European [moral rights] regime
gives authors a broad right to prevent creative appropriations of their existing works, it,
no less than proprietary copyright, unduly impedes such expression.”); KWALL, supra
note 1, at 54 (“[I]n developing appropriate moral rights protection for the United States, it
is critical to consider how these protections will impact the public domain.”).
97
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–20 (2003) (describing the fair use defense
in copyright law as an important built-in protection for free speech).
98
Ilhyung Lee, Toward an American Moral Rights in Copyright, 58 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 795, 814 (2001) (“Another example of the potential conflict between moral rights
and constitutional protections is the author who objects to the alteration or use of her
work by another who, in turn, claims that such alteration or use is parody or criticism,
permitted under the doctrine of fair use. Here, implementation of the traditional droit
moral may result in prohibiting actions based on the First Amendment’s right of free
expression.”).
99
Id.
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run contrary to the American socio-legal culture and
border on the heretical.100
Professor Lee goes on to suggest that the legislative creation of
a moral rights doctrine might, on this basis, even be regarded as an
unconstitutional regulatory taking.101 Other objections to moral
rights in the United States relate to the expansion in recent decades
of the kinds of subject matter covered by copyright law. While
copyright law now covers works such as computer programs and
original databases, these works are not the typical subjects of
moral rights protections as they have “little or no artistic, personal,
or cultural heritage [and] are ill-suited for moral rights
protection.”102 Of course, this concern could be accommodated in
a new moral rights agenda by limiting moral rights coverage to
more artistic and less functional works.103
Professor Marshall Leaffer has also raised more marketoriented concerns about the potential adoption of a moral rights
agenda within the United States even in the context of works that
have a significant artistic or cultural dimension:
Moral rights protection will inherently clash with
the way many works are created in cultural and
entertainment industries such as moviemaking,
publishing, and broadcasting. These intensely
collaborative endeavors are exploited through
subsidiary markets. For example, motion pictures
are abridged for television, textbooks are revised
and translated, and music is synchronized, adapted,
and broadcast in a multiplicity of forms. These
lucrative derivative markets, which attract
significant investment into the entertainment and
cultural industries, are regulated by contractual
agreement. But an expansive moral rights concept,
100

Id.
Id.
102
LEAFFER, supra note 3, at 400.
103
KWALL, supra note 1, at 148 (“[M]oral rights should be applicable to works
manifesting heightened originality with substantial creativity. If Congress were to follow
this approach, it would be appropriate to exclude completely works from coverage that
are largely functional and therefore lacking in significant artistic characteristics.”).
101
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presenting a constant threat of legal challenge
brought by any one or more collaborators, would
tend to undermine the economic expectations and
the delicate allocation of rights achieved through
private negotiation between authors, users, and
labor unions. The result may be less financial
support for such collaborative artistic endeavors,
ultimately harming the public interest.104
Contracting parties will be less certain of their rights where
third party creators are able to assert unexpected moral rights in a
way that significantly impacts on the performance of the contract.
Thus, any moral rights agenda needs to be carefully thought out
and implemented within the United States to ensure that major
commercial markets are not harmed to the detriment of the
economy and the public interest. Of course, thriving entertainment
industries also raise First Amendment concerns.
Movies,
television shows, books and the like are all important forms of
expression protected by the First Amendment. They are also forms
of commercial property that may be protected by the takings
clause.105 The models of moral rights protection proposed recently
by Professors Netanel and Kwall respectively attempt to strike this
delicate balance.
B. The Netanel Model
[T]he
law
can—and
should—give
some
accommodation to authors’ interest in creative
control, without excessively burdening creative
speakers.106
Drawing on the work of Professor Jessica Litman,107 Professor
Netanel has proposed a moral rights agenda for the United States
that emphasizes the right of attribution.108 In particular he focuses
on the concern that “those who disseminate a creative
appropriation should be required to label it as an unlicensed
104
105
106
107
108

LEAFFER, supra note 3, at 387.
See Lee, supra note 98, at 814.
NETANEL, supra note 9, at 215.
Id. (citing JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 185 (2001)).
See id. (citing LITMAN, supra note 107, at 185).
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modification of the original work.”109 In this context, the right of
attribution operates in tandem with a de facto right of integrity to
ensure that creators are not falsely attributed with distortions of
their works. Both Professor Litman and Professor Netanel have
identified ways in which modern digital technologies can assist
authors in protecting a right of attribution.
Professor Litman suggests that a modified version of a work
posted online could be required to be accompanied by a citation or
hypertext link to an unaltered copy of the author’s original work.110
Professor Netanel also suggests that if the focus is on the right of
attribution, digital technology makes compliance quite simple.111
The law could merely require copyright management
information112 that is digitally embedded in the original work to be
included in a creative appropriation of the work by a downstream
user.113 This is not much of a stretch from what the law already
requires under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”).
Currently this legislation prohibits the intentional removal,
alteration, or knowing falsification of copyright management
information from a protected work.114
Professor Netanel further stresses data from the Creative
Commons licensing scheme for copyright works,115 noting that
most authors utilizing these digital licenses impose attribution
requirements while significantly fewer authors are concerned about
the making of unauthorized downstream works.116 It appears
therefore that Creative Commons licenses are already used to
protect authors’ attribution rights albeit as part of a contractual
licensing scheme for use of a copyright work, rather than under
109

See id.
Id. (citing LITMAN, supra note 107, at 185).
111
Id. at 216.
112
See 17 U.S.C. § 1202(c) (2006) (defining copyright management information as
including information about the ownership of a work and the terms upon which the work
may be used).
113
See NETANEL, supra note 9, at 216.
114
See 17 U.S.C. § 1202(a)–(b).
115
NETANEL, supra note 9, at 217 (noting that Creative Commons estimates that “as of
February 2005, authors chose licenses requiring attribution some 94 percent of the time
and, in contrast, chose licenses prohibiting the making of a derivative work less than onethird of the time”).
116
Id.
110
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separate moral rights legislation. Thus, in today’s Creative
Commons context, the ability of a creator to protect her attribution
right will depend on her not having assigned copyright in the work
to someone else.
By focusing on the attribution right, Professor Netanel attempts
to strike a balance between First Amendment values and moral
rights. If the emphasis is on attribution, rather than integrity, there
is much less concern with downstream uses of a copyright work
being negatively impacted by moral rights. If downstream users
are only required to attribute—and maybe to link back to—the
original work, rather than to curtail their activities in any more
substantive way, there is much less of a threat to First Amendment
values than if downstream users are subject to unexpected claims
by authors that might prevent their expressive activities. Of
course, copyright holders can still bring infringement actions to
prevent unauthorized derivative works in cases where these works
are not protected as fair uses.117
Professor Netanel also claims to be promoting First
Amendment values with his model in the sense that the First
Amendment encompasses an author’s interest in avoiding forced
speech:
[A] requirement that creative appropriators take
reasonable steps to accord authorship credit for
underlying works and ensure that audiences
understand the source of the modified version can
help to protect authors’ interest in avoiding “forced
speech. . . .” [W]hile authors do not have a
cognizable speech interest in preventing another
from modifying their creative expression or using it
in a context that is not to their liking, they do have
such an interest in preventing the impression that
they endorse a message they find repugnant.118
Thus, by preserving downstream users’ rights to re-purpose the
original author’s creation, but by denying them the right to falsely
117

See Hetcher, supra note 67, at 1888–89 (noting that authors do bring copyright
lawsuits and send cease and desist letters to creators of fan fiction).
118
NETANEL, supra note 9, at 216.
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attribute the repurposed work, Professor Netanel would argue that
an appropriate balance is struck. Professor Netanel garners further
support for his focus on the attribution right by considering some
of Professor Rebecca Tushnet’s work in the context of fan fiction,
noting that authorship attribution is an extremely powerful norm in
that context.119
He also cites evidence that documentary
filmmakers place significant emphasis on authorship attribution.120
In further mitigating the potential negative impact of moral
rights law on downstream creative uses of copyright works,
Professor Netanel suggests that the attribution right could be
enforced under a “reasonableness standard rather than a hard-andfast rule.”121 A finding of infringement of the attribution right
might therefore depend to some extent on context. Thus, the
enforcement of the right could be eased in cases of noncommercial
use or in cases where the source of a modified work is obvious to
its audience, such as in the case of much fan fiction based on, say,
a popular television series.122
If Professor Netanel is correct in his intuition that the
attribution right is more important or acceptable in the United
States than the integrity right, it is worth considering the extent to
which this argument would address some of the concerns raised in
Part II by the supernatural fiction authors. Two of those
concerns—those raised by Anne Rice and Charlaine Harris—were
focused predominantly on unauthorized fan fiction. Stephenie
Meyer, on the other hand, while ambivalent about fan fiction was
certainly concerned about the unauthorized online dissemination of
her incomplete manuscript for Midnight Sun.123 Would the
Netanel approach, if implemented in practice, have addressed these
authors’ concerns in practice?
The first obvious shortcoming of the Netanel approach in
addressing Rice’s and Harris’s concerns about fan fiction is that
119

See id. at 217 (citing Rebecca Tushnet, Payment in Credit: Copyright Law and
Subcultural Creativity, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135 (2007)).
120
See id. (citing ASS’N OF INDEP. VIDEO AND FILMMAKERS ET AL., DOCUMENTARY
FILMMAKERS’ STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE 4–6 (2005)).
121
Id. at 216.
122
See id.
123
See supra note 90–92 and accompanying text.
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Professor Netanel does not advocate a moral rights agenda that
substantively impacts downstream creative uses of a work. Where
an original author’s objection is to the actual downstream use—the
creation of the fan fiction—as opposed to the lack of attribution or
false attribution, the Netanel model would have no application.
Moreover, as noted above, Professor Netanel notes that fan fiction
communities already have strong attribution norms,124 suggesting
that his model would have little practical impact on the way these
communities currently operate. Thus, to the extent that popular
fiction authors are unhappy with the way the system currently
operates, the Netanel model does not address their concerns at all.
Their concerns may be addressed by a broader moral rights agenda
that includes a right of integrity,125 but attribution by itself will not
likely help.
None of this is to suggest that authors’ interests should
necessarily be prioritized over those of their fans. However, it
does emphasize the fact that in making choices about adopting a
moral rights agenda, and the form of an appropriate moral rights
framework, there will always be winners and losers.126 The
Netanel model consciously elevates the creative needs of
downstream users—such as fan fiction communities—over those
of original authors.
Even in the absence of any moral rights agenda, authors who
retain copyright in their works can utilize contractual licenses and
the copyright law to control the substance of much fan fiction.
While it is unclear whether fan fiction will infringe copyright as an
unauthorized derivative work,127 copyright holders nevertheless

124

NETANEL, supra note 9, at 217 (citing Tushnet, supra note 119, at 135).
LEAFFER, supra note 3, at 387 (noting that the right of integrity includes the right to
prevent any intentional modification of an original work that would be prejudicial to the
artist’s honor or reputation).
126
See, e.g., Roeder, supra note 14, at 577 (“The [traditional European] doctrine of
moral rights favors the creator and the public against the entrepreneur and the
performer.”).
127
See Hetcher, supra note 67, at 1872 (noting the debate as to whether fan fiction and
online remixing is a copyright infringement or excusable fair use); Karjala, supra note
67, at 32–34 (noting conflicting case law concerning the extent to which works based on
the Harry Potter books are either regarded as copyright infringements or excusable fair
uses).
125
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can and do make claims for copyright infringement on this basis.128
Additionally, as noted by Professor Netanel, copyright holders can
utilize Creative Commons licenses when they release their works
online.129 These licenses can prohibit the creation of derivative
works at the author’s option, provided that the author has retained
copyright in the work.130
A more difficult question arises in attempting to apply the
Netanel model to the Midnight Sun controversy. In this case, as
with the fan fiction situations, attribution per se was not the key to
the problem. Stephenie Meyer was simply upset that unauthorized
copies of her work—that were attributed to her—were released on
the Internet before she was ready for people to read them. This
situation implicates the relationship between the rights of
attribution and integrity. The problem here for Meyer was the
dissemination of her work in a form in which she did not want
others to receive it. Unlike the typical concerns about authorial
dignity, the Midnight Sun situation did not involve a third party
revising a work and releasing it under the author’s name in a form
unapproved by the author. Rather, it involved a third party
releasing the author’s own work in a form unapproved by the
author.
As noted in Part I.B., Professor Leaffer has suggested that the
right of attribution will typically include the right of an author to
prevent the use of her name as the author of a work “in the event of
a distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work that
would be prejudicial to her honor or reputation.”131 While the
release of an unauthorized and incomplete early version of a
manuscript may be prejudicial to an author’s honor or reputation,
could it really be described as a “distortion, mutilation, or other
modification of the work?” Again, there is a strong argument that
the Netanel moral rights model would have no application here.

128
See Hetcher, supra note 67, at 1888–89 (noting that authors do bring copyright
lawsuits against creators of fan fiction).
129
See NETANEL, supra note 9, at 216–17.
130
About the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/licenses (last
visited Jan. 6, 2011).
131
LEAFFER, supra note 3, at 395.
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Again, this may well be as it should be. An author who has
retained copyright in her unpublished manuscript can use copyright
law to seek a remedy in situations such as the unauthorized release
of the manuscript. However, copyright law and copyright
remedies are premised on property rights rather than authorial
dignity, so the copyright model is not necessarily the best fit for
the perceived harm here. If the author is looking for an apology or
some other remedy related to her dignity, she will not find it in
copyright law. Of course, there may simply be no remedy that
addresses the kind of harm suffered by Meyer in this situation.
While an injunction may be available under copyright law, the
damage to Meyer’s artistic process was already done. She felt that
she had been violated as an author to the extent that she could not
complete the project. Neither copyright law nor moral rights law
may give her any practical comfort at the end of the day.
Of course, this depends on the breadth of one’s conception of
moral rights. While neither of Berne’s Article 6bis rights would
likely help authors like Meyer in the case of unauthorized
distributions of their own work, some of the broader civil moral
rights systems might cover this situation. Formulations of moral
rights that include the right to withdraw the work from publication
might be the kind of right that authors like Meyer would really be
seeking in situations like the Midnight Sun dilemma.132
However, the applicability of a right of withdrawal, even in
countries that maintain the right, can be limited in practice and
may not cover every situation in which an author desires to
withdraw a work from the public. As Professor Kwall has noted,
even in countries that maintain a right of withdrawal, the right
tends to be rarely exercised in practice.133 This is because in
countries like France, Germany, and Italy,134 the right to withdraw

132

See id. at 389 (noting that some formulations of moral rights include the right to
withdraw the work from publication); Roeder, supra note 14, at 556 (noting that some
European countries protect the right to withdraw and destroy the work as amongst the
author’s moral rights).
133
See KWALL, supra note 1, at 44.
134
See id. (noting that France, Germany, and Italy maintain a right to withdraw a work
as part of their moral rights law).
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only applies to published works,135 and only applies in situations
where the author can affirmatively establish severe harm as a result
of the inability of the work to represent her personal convictions.136
Thus, under current European formulations of the right to
withdraw, the dissemination of an unpublished manuscript that
does not cause severe harm to the author by misrepresenting her
current “convictions or spirit”137 would not likely infringe the
right.
The fact that the Netanel model does not provide a remedy for
any of the authors’ concerns raised in Part II does not of course
condemn it as an inappropriate moral rights agenda for the United
States. The aim of this discussion has merely been to demonstrate
that even the most carefully thought out moral rights models will
have to strike a balance somewhere, and cannot address
everybody’s concerns. Professor Netanel’s focus—like Professor
Litman’s and Professor Tushnet’s—is on encouraging creativity in
downstream markets while protecting authorial dignity in the
context of attribution. It is a thought-provoking model that may
well be worth adopting. However, it would still appear to fall short
of the United States’ international obligations under the Berne
Convention as it does not include the right of integrity. It would
also have to be developed to ensure that it is in compliance with
other aspects of Berne, such as the term of the attribution right.138
C. The Kwall Model
Societies that care about fostering the creation of
works of authorship should take seriously the idea
that authors are concerned about safeguarding the
textual integrity of their works . . . . [C]ompelling
135
See id. (“The right of withdrawal is best understood as a means of allowing authors
to ‘retract the economic rights that they may have assigned or licensed to a third party in
order to enable that third party to exploit the work.’” (quoting Cyrill P. Rigamonti,
Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353, 362 (2006))).
136
See id.
137
Id. (“[T]he author . . . enjoys the right to determine whether a work should be
withdrawn from the public if it no longer reflects the author’s convictions or spirit.”).
138
See Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 6bis(2) (“The rights granted to the author
in accordance with the preceding paragraph shall, after his death, be maintained, at least
until the expiry of the economic rights . . . .”).
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reasons exist for introducing noneconomic, or
inspirationally based, motivations into the dialogue
on authors’ rights.139
Professor Kwall’s model for a new moral rights agenda for the
United States is significantly broader than Professor Netanel’s
model. In particular, Professor Kwall rejects the notion that an
American moral rights agenda should focus solely on the right of
attribution.140 As Professor Kwall’s agenda is fairly broad, she
consciously focuses on general themes rather than technical
details.141 Her model would exclude from moral rights coverage
works that are largely functional as opposed to highly artistic.142
This would address concerns about the improper extension of
moral rights to works that do not necessarily reflect the personality
of the author such as computer software and largely functional
databases.143
Somewhat consistently with Professor Netanel’s approach,
Professor Kwall’s model would include broad protections for
attribution rights and narrower protections for integrity rights.144
Under the Kwall model, the attribution right would incorporate the
right to publish anonymously or pseudonymously and to later

139

KWALL, supra note 1, at 9.
See id. at 144 (“[A]lthough attribution may present a more clear-cut, and easier to
administer area than the right of integrity, both are deeply concerned with the author’s
dignity and esteem. In order for a right of integrity to be viable in the United States, it
will need to balance carefully competing interests and incorporate a large degree of
cabining measures.”).
141
See id. at 147 (“The proposal I develop . . . does not attempt to address every
possible issue in connection with enhanced moral rights legislation. On the contrary, it
explores some general themes and offers guidance with respect to how these themes can
impact the mechanics of a new statute.”).
142
See id. at 148 (“[M]oral rights should be applicable to works manifesting heightened
originality with substantial creativity. If Congress were to follow this approach, it would
be appropriate to exclude completely works from coverage that are largely functional and
therefore lacking in significant artistic characteristics.”).
143
See LEAFFER, supra note 3, at 400 (“[S]ome works are simply not appropriate for
moral rights, such as computer programs, databases, and other functional works. These
kinds of works that have little or no artistic, personal, or cultural heritage are ill-suited for
moral rights protection.”).
144
KWALL, supra note 1, at 149 (“[A]ttribution rights should be defined far more
broadly than integrity rights.”).
140
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claim authorship if the author so desired.145 This is important in
Professor Kwall’s view because these authorship decisions
“represent branding choices that can be a fundamental part of the
author’s meaning and message.”146
In terms of remedies, Professor Kwall would prefer that
violations of the attribution right be enforced by declaratory relief
that governs future distributions of an infringing version of a
work.147 Damages should generally not be an available remedy for
an infringement of the attribution right because of the typically
noneconomic nature of the injury to the author.148
In terms of the right of integrity, Professor Kwall suggests that
the right should be narrowly tailored to “vindicate the author’s
right to inform the public about the original nature of her artistic
message and the meaning of her work.”149 This could be achieved
through a requirement that the downstream modifier of the work
provide a disclaimer informing the public of the author’s objection
to her usage of the work.150 Of course, as recognized by Professor
Kwall, this assumes that the downstream user is not prevented
from making the modification to the work under copyright law.151
As with the attribution right, remedies under the proposed
integrity right should generally be limited to declaratory relief.152
In the case of the integrity right, the declaratory relief would
comprise mandating a disclaimer on a downstream use of the

145

Id. (“[The] author should have the right to publish a work anonymously or
pseudonymously, and to claim authorship at a later point in time should she so desire.”).
146
Id. at 150.
147
Id.
148
Id. (“In light of the predominant noneconomic nature of the injury, a damage
remedy should be eschewed except in the following instances: where a clear showing of
economic harm exists as a result of the attribution violation; where the violation is
entirely in the past and future injunctive relief therefore is meaningless; or where
exceptionally willful violations are involved.”).
149
Id. at 151.
150
Id.
151
Id. (“[The proposed integrity right] assumes that, absent the proposed right of
integrity, the actor would otherwise have the unencumbered right to use the author’s
work pursuant to copyright law.”).
152
Id.
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work.153 Professor Kwall further suggests that in order to obtain
relief, an author must establish that her objections to the use of her
work are “reasonably credible.”154
In terms of waiver, Professor Kwall would prefer that neither
the right of attribution nor integrity should be waivable.155 This is
because waiver is inconsistent with the notion that the rights
protect authorial dignity,156 and because allowing waivers
exacerbates inequalities of bargaining power that often exist
between creators of works and those with whom they contract.157
Professor Kwall further notes that because of the limited nature of
protection for the integrity right under her model, the typical
justifications for supporting a waiver provision are not present.158
In other words, where a downstream user is not prevented from
engaging in creative expression, but is only required to issue a
disclaimer, that user should not require a waiver of the integrity
right. The integrity right does not prevent her from engaging in
her downstream creative activity.
Professor Kwall also advocates a system in which moral rights
last only for the author’s lifetime.159 Although this view is
inconsistent with the Berne Convention,160 Professor Kwall

153

Id. (“As with the attribution right, an author should be entitled to enforce the right of
integrity prospectively through declaratory relief mandating a disclaimer. Further, an
author should be unable to enjoin a proposed use accompanied by an appropriate
disclaimer. For prior objectionable uses lacking a disclaimer, an author should be able to
obtain damages in cases involving clear economic harm, willfulness, or where the
conduct is entirely past and the possibility of a prospective disclaimer is unrealistic.”).
154
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
155
Id. at 156 (“In light of this proposal’s circumscribed protections for moral rights,
formal waivers should be inoperative as a general matter.”).
156
Id. at 156–57 (“Given that moral rights are designed to recognize inspirational
motivations for creativity, any system sanctioning waiver is inconsistent from a
theoretical standpoint with the justifications for adopting these protections. In other
words, if moral rights protections are intended to redress violations of authorship dignity,
they should not be capable of being waived.”).
157
Id. at 157 (“Moreover, allowing waiver exacerbates the disparity of bargaining
power between authors and those with whom they contract.”).
158
See id.
159
Id. at 159 (“[F]rom a theoretical standpoint, moral rights protection should exist for
the author’s lifetime, but not beyond.”).
160
Id. at 160 (“[The Berne Convention] provides that the covered rights are to be
maintained after the author’s death ‘at least until the expiry of the economic rights.’”).
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supports the model on the basis that no one other than the author
can “substitute a personal judgment regarding the substance of the
author’s meaning and message of her work.”161 This includes
members of the author’s family.162
Like Professors Litman and Netanel,163 Professor Kwall also
notes that modern digital technology would be very helpful in
implementing and enforcing the rights she proposes.164 Where
compliance with the moral rights focuses on appropriate attribution
and disclaimers, this is fairly easily achieved digitally, at least with
works in digital formats. As noted by Professor Netanel, copyright
management information is routinely incorporated into digital
works.165 Other information—such as the way in which the author
wishes to be attributed or the fact that the author objects to a
particular downstream treatment of a work—is likewise easily
incorporated into a digital work. Taking Professor Kwall’s model
a step in the direction of Professor Netanel’s model, one could
suggest that any new moral rights legislation should prevent the
removal of attribution information or disclaimers.
Returning, then, to our authors of supernatural fiction from Part
II, the question arises as to whether Professor Kwall’s model
would assist with the concerns raised by the authors in relation to
their works. As noted in Part III.B, any moral rights model that
focuses purely on attribution will be of little help for the kinds of
concerns described in Part II.166 This is because none of the
authors were particularly concerned about attribution. All of the
authors had raised some concerns about unauthorized fan fiction,
but the concerns had more to do with the existence of the fan
fiction than with the lack of attribution of the original work.

161

Id.
Id. (“No one, not even the author’s spouse and children, can substitute a personal
judgment regarding the substance of the author’s meaning and message of her work.”).
163
See supra Part III.B.
164
KWALL, supra note 1, at 154 (“[I]n many instances digital technology and the
Internet offer efficient and inexpensive means of complying with these suggested
reforms.”).
165
NETANEL, supra note 9, at 216.
166
See supra Part III.B.
162
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In fact, in her model, Professor Kwall particularly suggests that
enforcement of moral rights may generally be relaxed in the case
of parodies. In the context of a parody, the source of the material
being parodied is obvious from the context, and it is also obvious
that the work is unlikely to have been authorized by the original
creator.167 Thus, in Professor Kwall’s words, “when works are
parodied, an implicit disclaimer essentially exists.”168 While
parody does raise separate issues from fan fiction, there are clear
parallels. In both cases, the author may object to a downstream
expressive activity that makes unauthorized use of her original
work. Further, in both cases it is relatively clear from the context:
(a) that the author was the creator of the original work upon which
the new work is based; and (b) that the author is unlikely to have
formally approved creation of the new work. Thus, applying
Professor Kwall’s thoughts about parody to fan fiction, a new
moral rights agenda may not even require attribution or disclaimers
in the context of fan fiction.
Whether or not attribution or disclaimers would be required for
fan fiction under the Kwall model, the concerns raised by Anne
Rice, Charlaine Harris, and to some extent by Stephenie Meyer
about fan fiction are not fully addressed by the model. Both Rice
and Harris vehemently object to fan fiction—Rice to the point of
expressly attempting to ban it.169 Thus, simply requiring that
authors of fan fiction attribute the original source and issue a
disclaimer does little to help these authors, particularly given that
attribution and disclaimers may effectively be implied in the fan
fiction context in any event.
Again, this may well be as it should be. The entire thrust of
Professor Kwall’s model, as with Professor Netanel’s, is to
preserve First Amendment values and a vibrant public domain.
167

KWALL, supra note 1, at 163 (“It is precisely because the public understands that . . .
parodies are not authorized that the public is not deceived as to the persona’s involvement
in parody. Moreover, parody lacks the necessary public linkage between the author and
the externalized commodity because it is apparent that the author has not authorized the
use.”).
168
Id. at 159.
169
Anne Rice, Anne’s Message to Fans, Anne Rice Readers Interaction,
ANNERICE.COM, http://www.annerice.com/ReaderInteraction-MessagesToFans.html (“I
do not allow fan fiction. The characters are copyrighted.”) (last visited July 14, 2010).
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Thus, a moral rights agenda that would effectively ban or severely
restrict fan fiction activities is well outside the aims of these
models. As noted in Part III.B, it is possible that copyright law
may in fact do some of this work in cases where fan fiction is
found to be an unauthorized derivative work and not justified
under the fair use defense.170 There are arguments both ways on
these questions. A number of commentators suggest that much fan
fiction, even if an apparent infringement of the derivative work
right,171 is nevertheless excusable as a fair use,172 notably in the
case of noncommercial fan fiction.173
Again, the Midnight Sun scenario is potentially more
problematic than questions about fan fiction, even under the Kwall
model. As noted in Part III.B, Meyer’s concern about the
unauthorized postings of Midnight Sun on the Internet had nothing
to do with attribution. She was concerned with her unfinished
work being made available to the public before she was ready to
share it.174 Even an integrity right is of little use here because a
third party did not distort, modify or mutilate her work, but rather
posted it without authority. Interestingly, Meyer’s self-imposed
remedy consisted of her own disclaimer of sorts:
I’d rather my fans not read this version of Midnight
Sun. It was only an incomplete draft; the writing is
messy and flawed and full of mistakes. But how do
I comment on this violation without driving more
people to look for the illegal posting? It has taken
me a while to decide how and if I could respond.
But to end the confusion, I’ve decided to make the
draft available here (at the end of this post). This

170

See supra Part III.B.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2006) (reserving the right to create derivative works as an
exclusive right of the copyright holder).
172
Hetcher, supra note 67 (noting that there is a strong argument that much remixing
and fan fiction is fair use).
173
Id. at 1907–12 (applying a fair use analysis to typical noncommercial fan fiction and
arguing that much noncommercial fan fiction is likely to be fair use).
174
Stephenie Meyer, Midnight Sun: Edward’s Version of Twilight,
STEPHENIEMEYER.COM (Aug. 28, 2008), http://www.stepheniemeyer.com/midnightsun.
html.
171
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way, my readers don’t have to feel they have to
make a sacrifice to stay honest.175
She is basically saying that the draft she has released online is
not in a form that she wants her fans to read, but she understands
that some people will want to read it anyway. She would rather
they read her official version so they can “stay honest.”176 This is
somewhat analogous to Professor Kwall’s idea of using
disclaimers as a remedy for the integrity right. Professor Kwall’s
disclaimers work similarly by effectively saying that the work in
question is not in a form the original creator has authorized.177 The
idea is to maintain the original author’s dignitary interests in her
work without stifling downstream creativity. Meyer’s use of a
disclaimer with respect to her own work serves much the same
function. It suggests that she has not truly supported release of the
work in the form in which she has ultimately released it but she
understands the public interest in accessing the work so she is
prepared to make that sacrifice. While Professor Kwall’s focus is
on preserving a vibrant public domain, and Meyer’s focus is on
supporting her fans who want to read the work, the end result is
similar. At the end of the day, more creative work is released for
public consumption than would otherwise be the case, but the
author’s objections to the form of the work are publicly noted.
As with the fan fiction examples, it is possible that Meyer
could have used copyright law to obtain injunctions against the
unauthorized postings of her incomplete manuscript. However, as
noted in Part III.B, the injuries she claims to have suffered have
more to do with her own artistic integrity than with concerns about
pecuniary advantage.178 She seems more concerned with the way
in which the unauthorized release of the manuscript has interfered
with her creative processes than with her ability to actually control
the unauthorized distributions. In her response to the unauthorized
postings, she opts for more distribution of the work by officially
reproducing it on her own website, but at the same time she

175
176
177
178

Id.
Id.
See supra note 167.
See supra Part III.B.
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withdraws her earlier promise to her fans to complete the
manuscript.
CONCLUSION
What conclusions might be drawn from the above discussion of
recent American moral rights models juxtaposed against comments
by supernatural fiction authors about preferred uses of their works?
Focusing first on the moral rights models, it seems clear that the
new moral rights agendas proposed by Professors Netanel and
Kwall are moving away from the notion of compliance with the
requirements of the Berne Convention. Professor Netanel’s model
falls short of Berne obligations by focusing only on the right of
attribution and setting aside the right of integrity.179 Professor
Kwall’s model, whilst incorporating a right of integrity, includes
only a narrow protection for the right based on a requirement of
disclaimers placed on unauthorized reworkings of an original
work.180 This may, in fact, be in compliance with Berne, as the
Convention says nothing about precisely how moral rights are to
be enforced within domestic legal systems.181 Nevertheless,
Professor Kwall’s model falls short of Berne compliance in
requiring that the suggested moral rights terminate on the death of
the original author.182
The reasons that both the Netanel model and the Kwall model
are more restricted than the Berne requirements have much to do
with the need within the United States to incorporate powerful
constitutional guarantees such as the right to free speech under the
First Amendment and potentially concerns about unauthorized
takings.183 It may be the case that the United States is not in a
position to fully comply with its Berne obligations consistently
with its own Constitution. This may be a problem in the
179

See supra Part III.B.
See KWALL, supra note 1, at 151 (suggesting that in cases where a work that is still
identifiable as the original author’s work is repurposed by a second person, that person
“should be required to provide a disclaimer adequate to inform the public of the author’s
objection to the modification or contextual usage”).
181
See generally Berne Convention, supra note 2.
182
KWALL, supra note 1, at 160.
183
See supra Part III.A.
180
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international arena going forward. However, in the meantime it
may be appropriate for scholars like Professors Netanel and Kwall
to advocate moral rights agendas that are limited consistently with
constitutional values.
Both the Netanel model and the Kwall model place significant
emphasis on the right of attribution as a right that is consistent with
constitutional values and a right that is capable of giving effect to
powerful conceptions of authorial dignity.184 Both professors
further note the usefulness of modern digital technologies in
facilitating compliance with their moral rights agendas.185
Professor Kwall extends on the attribution right by incorporating a
limited right of integrity in her model that is enforceable generally
by disclaimer.186 Again, this is likely consistent with American
constitutional values and can take advantage of available digital
technologies for effective enforcement.
While likely consistent with constitutional values, neither the
Netanel model nor the Kwall model redresses the harms alleged by
the supernatural fiction authors discussed in Part II. Again, this
may be perfectly appropriate. Both models, in fact, consciously
seek to protect fan fiction—and some other expressive uses of
protected works187—against prohibitive and potentially
monopolizing claims by authors.188 The adoption of a moral rights
agenda will always necessitate a careful balancing act between the
rights of original authors, those with whom they contract to publish
and disseminate their works, and audiences for their works. The
kinds of balances sought to be struck by Professors Netanel and
Kwall consciously attempt to prioritize downstream creative uses
of works against author complaints, except to the extent that the
downstream uses harm the author by creating a false impression
about the author’s intended meaning or message.

184

See supra Part III.B; Part III.C.
See supra Part III.B; Part III.C.
186
See supra Part III.C.
187
See, e.g., KWALL, supra note 1, at 163 (noting the importance of protecting parody
from excessive moral rights claims).
188
Id.; NETANEL, supra note 9, at 215 (noting concerns that broad European-style moral
rights protections could impede downstream uses of protected works).
185
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If this is the accepted aim of a new moral rights agenda, then
downstream uses such as fan fiction and parody should not be
prohibited by new moral rights laws, although disclaimers may be
required in some cases. Of course, none of this speaks to the
extent to which copyright law may negatively impact these
downstream uses. It is still an open question whether much fan
fiction is an infringement of the derivative work right under
copyright law or rather may be excused as a fair use. The Netanel
and Kwall moral rights models each side-step this issue. Professor
Netanel’s model simply has no impact on this question because it
focuses on attribution, rather than integrity, the latter right being
the one typically implicated in the fan fiction context. Professor
Kwall’s model would only apply the moral right of integrity in
cases where the downstream expressive use was not otherwise
prohibited by copyright law. In other words, her model assumes
the inapplicability of copyright law to a particular use for the right
of integrity—and associated disclaimer remedy—to be
applicable.189
One of the more useful takeaways from this discussion might
be that both copyright law and moral rights law require important
balancing acts between the interests of multiple stakeholders.
Even the most well thought out models will have to prioritize
certain interests over others. Thus, in order to preserve First
Amendment values in the United States, it may be the case that
authors simply lose the ability to control a number of downstream
uses of their work. Savvy authors with sufficient bargaining power
may choose to impose restrictive copyright license terms on
downstream uses of their work. However, not all creators have
sufficient bargaining power to protect their interests in this way.
Many do not retain copyright in their works. Additionally, in
situations where there is no contract—such as the Midnight Sun
scenario described in Part II—contractual restrictions are
irrelevant.

189

See KWALL, supra note 1, at 151 (noting, for example, with respect to her proposed
right of integrity that her proposal “assumes that, absent the proposed right of integrity,
the actor would otherwise have the unencumbered right to use the author’s work pursuant
to copyright law”).
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If one adopts a moral rights agenda based on ideas advocated
by Professors Netanel or Kwall, authors are likely to find
themselves relying increasingly on copyright and contract law to
protect the kinds of interests identified in Part II. There is nothing
necessarily wrong with this result as a matter of practice.
However, it is useful in debating new moral rights agendas to
identify and acknowledge the kinds of interests that are unlikely to
be protected by such proposals. Authors may gain some comfort
from thinking about alternative methods for protecting interests
that are unlikely to be covered by moral rights. Alternatively,
authors may over time become more comfortable with the idea of
certain kinds of uses of their works, such as fan fiction. Stephenie
Meyer may be right in thinking that fan fiction is a good way for
new writers to cut their teeth within the fiction medium, while
hoping that they ultimately devise their own unique characters and
scenarios for their own uses.190

190

Genet, supra note 82 (“As long as the writers of [fan fiction] move on from it. I
think it’s sad to spend so much energy on something you can’t own. And that makes me
a little bit sad because all these talented kids should be, ya know, get your story out from
under the bed [sic] and get it out there.” (quoting Stephenie Meyer)).

